Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2009 23:38:52 -0400

From: "Brenner, Michael" <mbren@pitt.edu>

 

AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

 

Those of us who have sharply criticized the policies of the Bush, and now Obama administrations in the greater Middle East have reason to offer an alternative strategy. I dare to do so here.

 

There are two cornerstones to a different conception of how we should be thinking about the intersecting issues of the region. One is a revision of risk tolerance in regard to the threat of terrorism; the other is recognizing the crucial place that an agreement with Iran could have in stabilizing the Gulf and adjacent areas.

 

Fear has been the driving force behind American policy since 9/11. It explains not only the radical thrust of Washington’s actions but also the dulling of critical faculties. That pertains to torture and illegal surveillance as well as the ready resort to military power.

 

A prime manifestation of this fear is the drive to attain 100% security against another horrific event occurring. Zero tolerance for risk is the reference point for how the US has defined its ends and purposes. Most everything we have done in the GME stems from that cardinal fact (Iraq being a partial exception).

 

The implications are profound. For it means that American security is being defined in terms that do not permit tolerance for the very existence of any radical Islamist movement anywhere in the region since there is a danger that it could abet al-Qaeda and its associates or itself become a terrorist agent. The implications are profound:

 

* We must eliminate all vestiges of al-Qaeda as an organization

 

* We must render the Taliban in Afghanistan impotent

 

* We must do the same to the Taliban in Pakistan

 

* Therefore we must assume custodial responsibility for Afghanistan

 

* Therefore we must be ready to bring maximum pressure on whomever makes decisions in Islamabad to do our bidding or else take custodial responsibility, indirectly, for Pakistan as well

 

* We must persuade India, Russia, China and Iran to see the world through the terrorist optic so that they will support our campaign

 

* Relations with every other government in the GME are hostage to the ‘war on terror’ inter alia the Gulf states, Iraq, Israel and Iran

 

The implications are apparent in all of the above mentioned places. Most significantly, we render ourselves manipulable to the Israelis, we strive to create a pliable American friendly government in Baghdad against all odds, we endanger an opening to Iran by setting as conditions Tehran’s conforming to this agenda (e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan) above and beyond dealing with the nuclear question; our interference in Pakistan is the major factor in the growing strength of radical Ialamists.

 

Above all we are locked into a self-defeating set of policies that in their execution generate the very menace that we are trying to slay.

This never ending war is bankrupting us diplomatically, morally and financially.

 

By altering our risk tolerance, we can reformulate the terror threat as a police problem – writ large. This is the contention of the former head of MI -6, and of the former deputy director of France’s DGSE (former chief of counter-terrorism and an Arabist) among others. Sadly, this is a view that barely exists in America.

 

As to Iran, the key is to perceive how a firm, comprehensive security understanding with Tehran is the critical element to a reconfiguration of the region’s security politics, one that would be favorable to achieving reasonable outcomes on specific problems. Agreement on a security arrangement for the Gulf, certainly engaging all of the littoral states as parties, would have the following beneficial effects:

 

* We create strong incentives for the Iranians to cooperate with us on sundry aspects of the situation since they have no direct interest in tolerating, much less supporting, radical salafist groups

 

* We lay the basis for neutralizing the danger that Gulf states rulers see in their disaffected Shi’a populations

 

* We buffer the region from whatever happens in Iraq. Most likely that means either continuing sectarian strife, the emergence of a strongman – military or civilian – or both, perhaps in sequence. Whoever he is, he will be closer to Tehran than Washington, but will fake a low profile and follow a policy of reassurance in all directions, i.e. toward us, toward the Sunni Arab states, toward Iran. Therefore, we can disengage militarily and reduce our counter productive political interference. Those steps would reduce the negative feedback of anti-American emotions there and elsewhere.

 

* We improve the odds on a deal in Afghanistan that involves giving the Taliban a piece of the action-in exchange for tacit cooperation in keeping their violent elements in check. The objective of drastically scaling back our provocative presence becomes reachable.

 

* In Pakistan, we cease serving as grist for the mill of the Taliban and other radical Islamists by leaving Pakistan to the Pakistanis

 

* Finally, Israel. Implementing this strategy, and reaping the benefits in dampening all manner of conflicts, would take much of the wind out of the sails of the Israelis and their fervent backers in the United States.

They no longer would be able to ride the wave of terrorism paranoia and to superimpose their agenda in the region on ours. In racking up successes, the White House might also screw up its courage to tell the Israelis to cease and desist the brutalization of the Palestinians. That courage would be complementary to our own cool headed realization that the only prudent course is to recognize Hamas and to do whatever remains possible at this late juncture to seek reification of the two state resolution.

 

The harsh truth is that we have seen the enemy and it is us as much as ‘them’.

 

Cheers

 

Michael Brenner

University of Pittsburgh